Peace Through Strength NOW

These notes were taken at the 2026 Yalta European Strategy (YES) Annual Meeting, held in Kyiv on 11–12 September. The event brought together Ukrainian, European and US representatives, including ministers, elected representatives and senior officials, as well as scholars, journalists and business leaders. 

Disclaimer: These notes are intended to convey a general sense of the points I found most relevant. They do not attribute specific views or statements to individual participants, nor are they intended to provide an exhaustive account of the discussions. 

Introduction 

The conference conveyed a clear message: the war will ultimately end through negotiations, but credible diplomacy will be possible only if Ukraine and its partners first strengthen their military position and increase the economic cost to Russia of continuing its aggression. An end to the war remains distant; Ukraine will almost certainly have to endure at least one more winter of conflict. 

Moscow still appears determined to secure a visible territorial victory and is using hybrid attacks, nuclear threats and the testing of NATO’s political cohesion to weaken Western support. Participants called for firmer red lines, tighter sanctions, sustained pressure on Russia’s energy and industrial infrastructure, and Ukraine’s eventual integration into both the EU and NATO, eliminating strategic “grey zones”. 

At the same time, the conflict is transforming the nature of warfare. Ukraine has become a laboratory for drones, artificial intelligence and rapidly evolving weapons systems. Russia has also adapted, combining military production with civilian technologies and commercial supply networks and keeps innovating, though, for example, new more powerful types of drones. The blurring of the boundary between civilian and military infrastructure complicates both sanctions enforcement and the identification of legitimate military targets.

For Europe, the central problem is no longer primarily the volume of financial resources devoted to defence, but their fragmentation and slow deployment. European NATO members spend hundreds of billions of euros on defence yet obtain far less capability than the United States because procurement remains divided among national systems, standards and bureaucracies. The political priority should therefore shift from episodic assistance to Ukraine towards long-term industrial integration: joint investment, common procurement, interoperable weapons, faster export procedures and direct support for Ukrainian defence production. Ukraine should increasingly be treated not simply as a recipient of European aid, but as a strategic partner whose battlefield experience and technological capacity are essential to Europe’s own security and future defence autonomy.;

To be stressed that President Volodymyr Zelenskyy joined the conference via video link from Canada, where he was meeting with Carney. He announced the development of the “FREYA” air defence system and to request immediate missile reinforcements for the winter.

Here is a selection of the topic discussed:

I. Strategies for ending the war

The discussion focused on geopolitical strategies for ending the war in Ukraine, emphasizing the necessity of eventual negotiations while maintaining military and economic pressure on Russia. Participants debated the roles of the US and Europe, the effectiveness of sanctions, the threat of energy shortages, and the need to overcome the fear of escalation to establish clear red lines against Russian aggression.

1) Negotiation strategies and diplomatic contacts

• General sense was that predicting the war’s end is impossible, but it must conclude through negotiation. Current strategy aims to force Putin to engage seriously in talks. 

• Someone referenced Jared Kushner and Steve Witkoff’s Moscow trip as “blind amateurism.” CIA officials visited Moscow to maintain communication channels. 

• Europe must participate in the peace negotiations, also to address frozen assets and the broader European security concerns. 

2) Russian ambitions and military pressure

• Putin’s current goal involves claiming a triumph by capturing Donetsk. 

• Someone suggested Ukraine focus on striking Russian refineries to deplete resources. Damaging over half of Russian refineries would physically prevent continued land assaults. 

• Putin’s strategy of attacking Western Europe unites the continent and maintains consensus for high defense spending. 

3) European energy and political resilience

• Europe has adapted to energy challenges over the last five years. 

• European and Ukrainian security are intertwined; a defeat for one affects both. 

• European gas storage is 80% full, with Scandinavia utilizing renewables and France utilizing nuclear power. Russia can impact fertilizer production but cannot shut down European households anymore. 

4) Sanctions

• One of the panellists called for increased sanctions pressure, noting that European companies still trade LNG and metallurgical coal with Russia. Russia interprets continued trade as a sign that “business as usual” will return. 

• China provides backdoor support to Russia’s military-industrial complex. China is turning Russia into a “junior partner” and taking over its markets. 

• The Lindsey Graham Bill regarding sanctions passed the US Senate but stalled in the House of Representatives. 

5) NATO and strategic deterrence

• Putin uses NATO enlargement as a convenient excuse for aggression despite previously good relations with member states. 

• NATO should exercise “thorough aggression” to make Putin uncertain of Western responses.  

• Troop levels in Kaliningrad and on the Finnish border remain low, suggesting Putin does not fear a NATO attack. 

• One of the panellists argued that Ukraine must join NATO and the EU to eliminate “gray zones” in European security. 

II. Effectiveness of international sanctions

The discussion covered intelligence assessments regarding the effectiveness of international sanctions, the strategic targeting of Russian military and logistics infrastructure, and the internal political stability of the Putin regime. It was also discussed the dual threats of Russian military escalation and potential state collapse, analysing Russia’s strategy of “horizontal escalation” to test NATO’s Article 5.  

1) Risk of escalation and Art. 5 testing

• Talks of increased reckless events and horizontal escalation over the coming months. Russia lacks a clear “theory of victory” for the war in Ukraine. 

• Russia utilizes hybrid attacks to pressure Europe into withdrawing support for Ukraine. US intelligence services changed their threat assessment in June 2026 to indicate potential Russian land incursions or massive cyberattacks against NATO. 

• NATO increased deterrence activities near Kaliningrad and the Baltic states using air assets. Polish officials reported having specific knowledge of Russian plans for Poland. 

• A Russian crumbling regime may attack NATO to create a “rally-around-the-flag” effect domestically.  

• One of the speakers noted a lack of full-scale conventional military buildup but warns of limited ground invasions and drone/missile strikes. 

• Russia aims to invalidate NATO Article 5 by creating scenarios where the alliance hesitates to respond. 

• Putin prioritizes staying in power and may escalate to satisfy demands from Russian nationalists. 

• Someone argued that testing Article 5 requires “boots on the ground” because NATO is unlikely to invoke it for cyberattacks alone. 

• Potential flashpoints for limited incursions include Narva (Estonia), Gotland, and Svalbard. 

2) International sanctions and supply chains

• Sanctions restrict Russian access to modern Western-made navigation systems for ballistic and cruise missiles. International restrictions prevent the movement of electronic components from China and other global suppliers to Russian industry. Russian Federation faces production problems due to restricted Chinese components. 

• Ukrainian intelligence obtained reports confirming delivery failures for Chinese components. China recognizes potential consequences and risks to its own industry, regarding chemical and electronic supplies to Russia. 

3) Deep strikes on industrial and logistics targets

• Ukraine identifies all enterprises involved in Russian military production, including joint ventures with Chinese companies. Many of these facilities sit over 2,000 kilometres from the Ukrainian border. 

• Reaching distant targets requires deep strikes using Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs). A recent strike targeted a major Chinese Russian joint venture involved in chemical production. 

• Marketplaces such as Wildberries and Ozon are integrated into the Russian Armed Forces’ logistics system. These centers support Russian grouping forces within occupied Ukrainian territory. 

4) Strategic status of the Kerch bridge

• Ukraine destroyed most logistics routes through Crimea except the Kerch bridge. The bridge currently carries cars and civilian passengers, serving as an exit route for occupiers to return to Russia. 

• The bridge lost primary strategic importance as most weaponry and goods move via a land bridge through Rostov Oblast. However, the bridge remains a symbol of occupation for Putin rather than a critical military supply line. 

• Past discussions regarding bridge destruction involved European concerns over Russian nuclear escalation. 

5) Nuclear blackmail

• Ukrainian intelligence assesses nuclear threats as blackmail rather than immediate intent. Nuclear use would pose risks to the current Russian regime. 

• International positions from China, the US, and Europe influence the Russian nuclear calculation.

III. Technology in the battlefield

The discussion addressed the rapid evolution of drone technology and AI on the Ukrainian battlefield, emphasizing the shift toward “total war” where traditional assets like tanks and ships are increasingly obsolete. Participants identified critical needs for scaling production, securing consistent Western funding, and reforming defense bureaucracies to match the speed of private-sector innovation. 

1) Technological transformation of the battlefield

• Ukraine serves as the global frontier for both democratic defense and advanced military technology. 

• Traditional military assets like ships and tanks have become high-risk targets within the current 50-kilometer “kill zone.” 

• Russia successfully integrated jet-powered Shahed / Geran drones with mesh networks and intermediate router points to bypass Starlink. Russia plans to launch “RusNet,” a proprietary satellite communication network, in 2025. 

• Ukrainian forces face 3,000-kilogram Russian glide bombs launched at Mach speed with GNSS guidance. 

• FPV drones are being outflanked by faster, longer-range solutions, as the technological cycle accelerates. 

• Total war now involves recursive learning systems where technology must be updated monthly to remain effective. 

2) The nature of drone warfare and innovation cycles

• Drones represent a change in military doctrine rather than just a new tool. Innovation cycles last between three and twelve months from development to battlefield scaling. Success relies on micro-breakthroughs where one side dominates for a few months before the next cycle begins. 

• Interceptors for Shahed drones faced obsolescence within four months due to the introduction of jet engines. 

• Innovation stems from three sources: enemy tactics, military feedback, and technological breakthroughs. 

3) Strategic trends in deep strikes and ballistics

• Ukraine launched twice as many deep-strike drones as Russia in 2026. Ukrainian drones recently struck targets in the deep Ural region. 

• Five Point is finalizing the FP-7 short ballistic missile for deployment within weeks. 

• FP-7 development included 16 successful test launches. 

• Five Point is developing a long-range ballistic missile with a planned 855-kilometer range. 

• An Ukranian anti-ballistic air defense program is underway using an interoperable “Lego” design with European partners. First test interceptions for the new air defense system are scheduled for late 2025. 

4) Manufacturing and resource challenges

• Engineering talent is the most critical resource shortage for Ukrainian producers. 

• Design for manufacturing is essential to ensure R&D projects can reach mass production. 

• Ukrainian procurement succeeds because military commanders order equipment based on immediate battlefield performance. 

5) International cooperation

• Approximately 60% of critical components in Russian ballistic missiles are imported from the US or Europe. 

• Russian manufacturers bypass sanctions by masking microchips as civilian Wi-Fi routers. 

• One European export license for a missile component took 18 months to process, exceeding the 9-month development time of the missile itself. 

• The “Instruments of War” (gov.ua) database / website tracks Western companies providing components found in Russian weaponry. 

• Magura maritime drones are evolving to target helicopters and fighter jets in addition to ships. 

6) Scaling and defense bureaucracy reform

• Ukraine intends to produce 10 million drones annually but faces limitations in pilot availability. 

• The US Army conducted a massive hackathon to integrate 150 siloed defense systems for real-time data sharing. 

• The Pentagon is transitioning from a 90% custom-build model to a 90% off-the-shelf commercial technology approach. 

• Scaling requires Western contract manufacturers to bypass “paperwork latency” that results in battlefield casualties. A proposed “two-sided marketplace” would allow 50 pre-cleared countries to share and purchase compatible defense tools. 

7) AI and the future of warfare

• AI in drones is moving beyond simple visual recognition toward Large Language Models (LLMs) for strategic reasoning. Ukraine is developing an automated AI system to manage millions of daily battlefield actions that exceed human capacity. 

• AI systems can reduce the “coordination tax” in slow bureaucracies by automating logistics and planning. 

• Ethical guidelines adopted by the Pentagon require a “human in the loop” to authorize weapons in specific areas and times. 

• AI-driven planning systems can compress red tape by allowing computers to negotiate border and shipping paperwork. 

• AI acts as a co-pilot to filter 1,000 hypotheses down to three viable prototypes in weeks. 

• Truly autonomous aerial systems are currently in use, with broader soldier replacement estimated in two to five years. 

• Recursive learning allows weapon systems to become progressively smarter through continuous data feedback. 

8) Geopolitics and funding

• US funding for Ukraine has significantly decreased since January 2023 due to the lack of a new supplemental package. 

• The European Union extended a 90-billion-euro loan, though disbursement remains ongoing. 

• Allies are debating the immediate use of 250 billion euros in frozen Russian assets for defense rather than post-war reconstruction. 

• Iran is actively reverse-engineering Western weapons captured in Ukraine to enhance its own military capabilities. 

• The drone threat is expanding globally, targeting stadiums, ports, borders, and data centers outside of active war zones. 

• Private venture capital is identified as a necessary “dry powder” source to supplement government military budgets. 

IV. European Ukrainian cooperation

The panel discussion focused on the strategic necessity of European Ukrainian cooperation to deter Russian aggression. Participants addressed the shift from providing financial aid to fostering industrial investment, the inherent inefficiencies in fragmented European defense spending, and the urgent requirement for increased speed in military decision-making. The discussion also covered the development of a new anti-ballistic missile coalition, and the long-term goal of achieving European strategic autonomy. 

1) Military investment and the drone industry

• Modern warfare costs are high and require a transition from aid deliveries to mutual investment. 

• Ukraine’s drone industry remains heavily under-invested despite high levels of technological development. 

• Investing in existing Ukrainian production is more cost-effective than reviving production lines in other European countries. 

• Ukraine now delivers sophisticated long-range missiles and drone technology to the battlefield. 

2) European defense inefficiency

• The European economy is ten times larger than Russia’s, with a GDP of approximately $25–$27 trillion. 

• European NATO members spent over $500 billion on defense last year, representing 60% of US defense spending. 

• Europe fails to achieve 60% of US capabilities due to fragmentation across 27 different defense ministries and armies. The US operates one main battle tank type, while Europe operates 14 different types. The US uses four submarine types, whereas Europe maintains 17 different types. 

• The “Sparta 2.0” paper (https://www.kielinstitut.de/fileadmin/Dateiverwaltung/Media/Images/News_Press_Releases/2026/Achieving_European_Defence_Autonomy__A_Roadmap_for_Overcoming_Critical_Dependencies.pdf) estimates that €500 billion in investment is required over 5–10 years to close gaps in AI, electronic warfare, and reconnaissance. 

3) Anti-Ballistic missile coalition

• Ukraine currently lacks sufficient interceptors to stop constant ballistic hits on civilian areas. 

• A joint European system is necessary because only the US-made Patriot system currently intercepts ballistics effectively. 

• The coalition held its first meetings in Paris and Oslo to coordinate five to seven countries and their respective defense companies. 

• The Oslo meeting included the Ukrainian President, the Norwegian Prime Minister, and various CEOs to establish strict deadlines and responsibilities. 

4) French and German support

• France has doubled its defense spending and continues to accelerate military procurement despite domestic budget cuts. 

• Germany provided nearly €12 billion in aid this year and is focusing on winter preparation and sky protection. 

• Germany is redirecting funds this Fall toward jet drones and Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) tools. 

• Effective deterrence requires “going for the archers” (launching sites) rather than just “shooting the arrows” (intercepting missiles). 

5) EU and NATO integration

• Ukraine is pursuing accession to the OECD to facilitate reconstruction, referencing the Marshall Plan model. 

• Ukraine claims to have fulfilled military and security criteria for NATO and is ready to open EU negotiation clusters. 

• The EU accession process remains merit-based, requiring reforms in the rule of law, judiciary independence, and anti-corruption. 

6) Corruption and internal governance

• The Office of the President acknowledges that corruption scandals during wartime damage national morale. 

• The administration operates in a “25/8” working mode to manage international portfolios and frontline weapon scarcities. 

• Maintaining optimism and an alert status is cited as a prerequisite for winning the war. 

V. Domestic Russian power dynamics

The discussion focused on Russia, both on its domestic situation and on its strategic aims. It included an assessment of Putin’s regime resilience. 

1) General assessment

• Intelligence assessments show a decrease in support for the United Russia party. 

• The Russian regime fears internal destabilization and the potential collapse of the Federation. New decrees increase the responsibility of special services and tighten internal security. 

• Russia will likely “attack first” and “collapse later”… Russian leadership employs “table domination” game theory, escalating losses to intimidate and force other players out. 

• National liberation movements and strong local identities exist in Siberia, Ural, and among Kazakhs in Kuban and Don...Tatarstan possesses economic and social capacity comparable to Denmark. 

2) Putin’s personal motivations and ideology

• Putin is personally obsessed with the minutiae of war. He views himself as a historic “gatherer of lands” alongside Peter the Great and Catherine the Great. 

• Russian ideology is eroding; ideologue Aleksandr Dugin recently failed to articulate a coherent vision for Russia’s future. 

• Russian state media has normalized the casual discussion of nuclear weapon use. 

• Fuel shortages and drone strikes in Moscow are beginning to undermine the public’s trust in state television. 

3) Internal splits and structural clashes 

• Two distinct groups exist within Putin’s circle: one favoring continued war and another favoring a negotiation process. A structural clash has emerged between Putin’s imperial rule and the rising xenophobia of Russian ultranationalists. 

• The war forces Putin to reconcile the need for minority recruits and immigrant labor with an increasingly racist ultranationalist base. 

• Private military companies owned by various oligarchs increase the risk of civil war if the central regime collapses.